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The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  explore  the  future  of  the  EU’s 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in terms of its objectives. In order to do this, the  
reasons behind this policy tool, its structure, and the changes it brought to the 
EU’s relationships with its neighbours are analyzed. The article investigates the  
areas in which the ENP has been successful and pinpoints the deficiencies which  
have lead to its failure in other areas. The analysis concludes that the ENP has  
enhanced the EU’s role in the international arena and improved the credibility of 
its foreign, security and defence policies despite the fact that it is still a very new 
policy. Nevertheless, the policy is by no means perfect and there exists scope for  
further improvement in terms of its effectiveness.
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1. Introduction
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been designed to create 
closer ties between the EU and its neighbouring countries, without offering them a 
membership  perspective.  It  aims  at  promoting  greater  economic  development, 
stability  and better  governance in the EU’s neighbourhood. The ENP dates to 
early  2002,  when  the  UK  emphasized  a  “wider  Europe”  initiative  involving 
Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine (Smith, 2005: 759). In December 2002, the 
Copenhagen  European  Council  approved  it  by  including  the  southern 
Mediterranean countries. 
The new EU, with its ten new member states and new borders, is facing 
new challenges beside the new opportunities. Especially, with the changes in its 
borders, reshaping the external relations with its neighbours has been a priority for 
the EU (Rossi, 2004: 9). In this respect, the ENP has brought major changes to the 
EU’s external relations. For instance, prior to the ENP, the EU used to set up its 
relations  with  non-member  countries  by  using  its  enlargement  policy  as  an 
instrument in terms of offering them membership conditional on the acceptance of 
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specified conditions set out in the treaties. The EU’s this enlargement ambition 
had stemmed from its desire to surround itself by countries which are politically 
and economically stable and those who would be willing to adopt its norms and 
values.  This  was  an  aspiration  through  which  the  EU  aimed  at  maintaining 
stability and security in its immediate neighbourhood, especially without any need 
for  using  force.  Indeed,  this  has  also  led  to  the  foundation  of  the  European 
Security Strategy (European Council, 2003: 1-15). It was with this consideration 
that the EU started to deal the accession with a number of countries since end of 
the Cold War in 1989, including those located in Central and Eastern Europe. In 
this  respect,  the major  intention has  always been to  promote peace,  increased 
prosperity and security within the Central and Eastern Europe (Wallace, 2003: 1). 
This was mainly targeted at the countries which demanded EU membership and, 
thus, were wiling to complete the political and economic criteria set forth by the 
EU. Accordingly, the candidate countries committed themselves to make reforms 
in their national political and economic arrangements and to accept the Acquis 
Communautaire required by the EU for full membership (Wallace, 2003: 3).
Nonetheless, In due course, the EU began to face the dilemma of where its 
final borders should be set. For this reason, in 1989 the European Community 
attempted to  design a  strategy for  Free Trade Area member countries without 
letting them in by creating the European Economic Area (EEA) which extended 
the single European market to other countries without formal participation in the 
law-making  process.  In  1993,  Copenhagen  European  Council  transformed  the 
idea of  European Political  Area (EPA),  within which European leaders would 
meet regularly, and Central and East European countries could be associated with 
specific  EC  policies  and  participate  in  meetings,  to  establish  a  “structured 
relationship” for discussions on all areas of EU business with the Central and East 
European countries (Smith, 2005: 771). In 1997, this was replaced with European 
Conference by the Luxembourg European Council as a means of linking the EU 
and the then 13 applicant  Countries.  Meanwhile,  the EU also started Stability 
Pacts to promote regional co-operation in Eastern Europe. 
For  instance,  in  the  Balkans,  in  order  to  prevent  conflicts  and achieve 
conflict  management  the  EU  established  CARDS  programme  beside  the 
Stabilization and Association Process in Southern-Eastern Europe with offering 
membership at the completion of the process. In the Mediterranean front, it set up 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995 by using MEDA aid programme and 
signing multilateral agreements, which is also known as Barcelona Process, and 
involves economic, social and political co-operation between the EU and the 12 
Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, 
Morocco,  the  Palestinian  Authority,  Syria,  Tunisia,  and  Turkey)  (Euromed 
Report, 2004 and Rossi, 2004: 8-9). Furthermore, the EU Strategic Partnership 
with the Mediterranean and the Middle East was adopted in June 2004 in order to 
provide a policy framework with a view to promoting political,  economic and 
social  reform,  and  to  contributing  to  the  socio-economic  development  of  the 
neighbouring countries in this geography (Euromed Report, 2004). 
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The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  explore  the  future  of  the  EU’s 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in terms of its objectives. In order to do this, the 
reasons behind this policy tool, its structure, and the changes it brought to the 
EU’s relationships with its neighbours will  be analyzed. More specifically, the 
next section will investigate why the ENP was developed, analyzing the reasons 
that  led  to  the  formation  of  this  policy  from  the  EU’s  external  relations 
perspective. Section II will evaluate the structure of the ENP, putting emphasis on 
the Action Plans, which are the most effective policy instruments used within the 
ENP. The last section will conclude with a discussion of whether the ENP has 
achieved  its  objectives  or  not.  This  will  be  done  from  a  broad  perspective, 
analyzing the areas in which the ENP has been successful and pinpointing the 
deficiencies which have lead to its failure in other areas. In addition to these, the 
impacts of this policy on the countries of different neighbouring regions will be 
briefly discussed.
Foreshadowing the results of the analysis, it is concluded that the ENP has 
enhanced the EU’s role in the international arena and improved the credibility of 
its foreign, security and defence policies despite the fact that it is still a very new 
policy. Nevertheless, it  has also been identified that the policy is by no means 
perfect  and  there  exists  scope  for  further  improvement  in  terms  of  its 
effectiveness.
2. The European Enlargement and the ENP
The enlargement of the EU has increased the need for a rearrangement of 
the  way  the  EU  conducts  its  relations  with  the  neighbouring  countries.  This 
necessity led to the formation of the ENP. Especially after the recent enlargement 
in 2004, the geographical limits of the EU have deemed to be approaching, and 
enlargement has seemed to cease. Indeed, the EU has several reasons for stopping 
its  enlargement.  For  instance,  the  recent  accession  of  ten  new  members  has 
resulted in a need for a gestation period. Besides, the new Eastern neighbours are 
not  very  easily  integrated  (Haukkala,  2006:  7-9).  Therefore,  although the  EU 
acknowledges its enlargement policy as one of the most successful foreign policy 
tools (European Commission, 2003: 5) it has serious concerns regarding the future 
viability of its institutions and structures with respect to a possible collapse due to 
over-enlargement and enlargement-fatigue. 
However, there seems to be no legal basis for a formal decision for ceasing 
enlargement. What is more, should the EU officially decides to stop enlargement, 
it  will  risk  losing  its  capacity  for  effectively  stabilizing  its  neighbours  and 
promoting its values and norms. Consequently, in the recent years, the ENP has 
gained importance as one of its most effective foreign policy tools in terms of 
maintaining  its  normative  power  in  Europe.  In  a  sense,  for  the  EU,  the  ENP 
represents both the avoidance and continuation of enlargement by other means. It 
not only enables the EU to avoid answering the question whether the enlargement 
has ceased, but also to continue its normative hegemony just as in the accession 
process (Haukkala, 2006: 9-11). The ENP targets EU’s relations with both its old 
and new neighbours, in order to surround EU by a “ring of friends” (Smith, 2005: 
771). 
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This policy is necessary to encourage neighbouring countries to have good 
relations with the EU and to co-operate willingly to promote regional economic 
and political stability (Harris, 100). In this respect, the ENP is also related to the 
geographical  proximity concept  introduced in the Lisbon European Council  in 
1992 to foster the cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), 
the Balkans (Croatia, Bosnia, Former Yugoslavian Republic Of Macedonia) and 
the  Mediterranean  (Cyprus,  Malta,  Turkey,  Morocco,  Algeria,  Tunisia,  Egypt, 
Jordan, Israel, Palestine Authority, Lebanon and Syria). 
3. Structure of the ENP
The ENP includes a number of frameworks for partnership such as the 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
(PCAs) and TACIS programme with the former Soviet republics. In particular, it 
concentrates  on  developing  bilateral  relations  between  the  EU  and  individual 
countries to influence their internal and external policies. In this respect, it follows 
the routines of the context of the enlargement such as “negotiated bilateralism” 
and “positive conditionality” (Lavanex and Schimmelfennig, 2006: 143). At the 
basis of the ENP lies the concept of differentiation between partner countries. In 
this respect, the ENP explicitly addresses the problem of difference among the 
neighbouring  partners,  and  adopts  the  method  of  bilateralism,  namely,  single 
nation action plans, rather than broad regional cooperation. In other words, the EU 
recognises the significance of the difference among the neighbouring partners, in 
terms of their regional, economic, administrative, and institutional capacities. 
The,  ENP  involves  a  progressive  approach  towards  the  neighbouring 
countries in order to introduce a gradual engagement for each state in accordance 
with its willingness to progress with the economic and political reforms. It is also 
worth noting that the policy is not based on  political conditionality,  but rather 
involves  clear  definitions  of  the  actions  that  the  EU  expects  the  partners  to 
implement.  The  related  benchmarks  are  primarily  in  the  areas  of  politics  or 
economics, depending on which targets and reforms have been mutually agreed 
on (Rossi, 2004: 11).
As mentioned earlier, the ENP was developed in the context of the EU’s 
2004  enlargement,  in  order  to  avoid  the  probable  dividing  lines  between  the 
enlarged EU and its neighbours and to maintain the stability and security in its 
immediate  neighbourhood.  The  ENP,  therefore,  primarily  targets  the  EU’s 
immediate neighbours such as Algeria, Belarus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. 
In 2004, it was extended to also include the countries of the Southern Caucasus 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgi. Although Russia is also a neighbour of the EU, 
relations with this country are instead developed through a Strategic Partnership 
process (Commission, 2004: 7). On the other hand, Turkey’s candidacy to EU 
makes this  country not  eligible  to  participate  in  ENP.  Since the ENP aims at 
enhancing the EU’s relations with its neighbours on a mutual benefit and shared-
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values basis, it also offers benefits to the involved countries in terms of increasing 
their integration with the EU (European Commission, 2003: 4). In this respect, he 
EU  uses  its  enlargement  policy  to  promote  its  values  and  norms  in  the 
neighbouring countries through persuasion and dialogue and, not against the will 
of them. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that if the EU stops its enlargement process and 
does not accept new applications, it may lose the principal incentive that it offers 
in  return  for  accepting  its  norms  and values,  as  well  as  for  fulfilment  of  the 
required reforms by the neighbouring countries. It is with this consideration that 
the EU has been developing the ENP in order to preserve its normative power and 
its ability to promote its values and norms in its neighbourhood (Haukkala 2006: 
9). In this respect, the current problem seems to be the fact that EU does not have 
a  well-defined  criterion  that  defines  which  countries,  can  be  accepted  for 
membership and which cannot. In other words, it is not known clearly what the 
limits of the EU are and where the borders of the EU would end. Particularly, with 
the recent enlargement, now EU has borders with some problematic regions such 
as the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Before enlargement, EU did not have 
much reason to concern itself with the developments in these regions. But now, it 
has to involve in the latest developments in these regions very closely and has to 
promote  policies  to  maintain  stability  in  these  regions.  Therefore,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  the  ENP primarily  targets  stability  and  security,  as  well  as  to 
contribute to efforts at conflict resolution in the problematic neighbourhoods. In 
the  south,  it  supports  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership  to  promote 
infrastructure interconnections and networks in order to reinforce the European 
security strategy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. In the East, where the 
enlarged EU shares new borders with the new neighbours, the Union is faced with 
a  number  of  security  challenges  such  as  illegal  trafficking,  organized  crime, 
terrorism, nuclear proliferation and environmental degradation. 
In addition to security issues such as preventing terrorism, proliferation of 
weapons  of  mass  destruction,  the  ENP also  focuses  on  social  issues  such  as 
immigration,  better  governance,  human  rights,  political  reform,  trade 
liberalization,  education,  and  the  role  of  civil  society  (Lavanex  and 
Schimmelfennig, 2006: 147-148). In this respect, there exists a dual emphasis in 
the structure of the ENP, where the need for jointly tackling security threats and 
sharing the benefits of enlargement with neighbours is particularly emphasized 
(European  Council,  2003:  7-8).  In  addition  to  these,  the  ENP  brought  new 
dimensions  into  existing  relationships  in  the  areas  such  as  justice  and  home 
affairs, energy, environment, and transportation (Lavanex and Schimmelfennig, 
2006:  143).  The EU provides financial  and technical  assistance to support  the 
implementation of these objectives, in order to encourage the partner countries’ 
efforts.
The structure of the ENP is not very complicated. In the beginning of the 
process, the ENP targets at a specific country, the Commission prepares Country 
Reports assessing the political and economic situation as well as institutional and 
sectoral aspects of this country in order to assess when and how it is possible to 
deepen relations with it. Next, ENP Action Plans are developed. These are the 
major policy tools which involve bilateral partnerships for reform signed between 
the EU and the partner country to identify priorities for action in the respective 
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areas. The action plans are tailor-made for each country based on its needs and 
capacities, as well as the mutual interests. The Action plans also define an agenda 
of political and economic reforms by means of short and medium-term priorities 
ranging from 3 to 5 years, which can be renewed by common agreement (Lavanex 
and Schimmelfennig, 2006: 144). 
The ENP action plans were negotiated and formally adopted in 2005 with 
seven  countries  Israel,  Jordan,  Moldova,  Morocco,  the  Palestinian  Authority, 
Tunisia  and  Ukraine.  Further  plans  are  under  preparation  for  Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Lebanon, Algeria, Belarus, Libya and Syria (Lavanex 
and  Schimmelfennig,  2006:  144).  Regarding  the  Mediterranean  countries,  the 
action  plans  focus  on  Euro–Mediterranean  co-operation  and  on  deepening 
relations  with those countries.  These action Plans have primarily involved co-
operation in  foreign and security  and defence  policies;  preparations  for  a  free 
trade area, sectoral co-operation, as well as co-operation on foreign and security 
policy issues, including crisis management (Lavanex and Schimmelfennig, 2006). 
With  the  action  plans,  the  countries  also  commit  to  EU’s  external  actions, 
including the fight against  terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction,  as  well  as  abidance  by  international  law  and  efforts  to  achieve 
conflict resolution. In these areas, the Implementation of the reforms and efforts 
are  supported  through  various  forms  of  EC-funded  financial  and  technical 
assistance.  For  instance,  in  2007, the  Commission introduced  the  European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) as a comprehensive new fund 
to promote co-operation, together with a new lending mandate of the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) (Europa web site).
In a nutshell, the action plans are mainly related to enhancing political co-
operation and the Common Foreign and Security  Policy with the objective of 
sharing  the  benefits  of  the  EU’s  enlargement  with  neighbouring  countries  in 
strengthening  stability,  security  and  well-being.  The  implementations  are 
regularly monitored through sub-committees. The plans are replaced by European 
Neighbourhood Agreements, i.e. bilateral agreements, when Action Plan priorities 
are met. Progress made in this way enables the EU and its partners to agree on 
longer term goals for the further development of relations in the future. 
4. The Future of the ENP
When we evaluate the ENP in light of the previous two sections, we can 
conclude that the ENP has been a helpful foreign policy initiative for the EU. In 
general, the ENP has been successful on a country-by-country basis. In the East, 
for instance, Ukraine’s progress on democracy, freedom of the media, has been 
fine. Moldova aims at a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU in 
2008. It has made the implementation of the ENP Action Plan a central element of 
its  reform process.  Georgia  has  been  gathering  wide  support  for  reforms  and 
recognition as one of the regional front-runners. Armenia sees ENP as a way to 
escape  regional  isolation  and  promote  economic  development.  The  biggest 
problems seems to be Russia, which has refused to be part of the ENP (Emerson 
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et al, 2007: 29-30), and Azerbaijan, which has been reluctant in integrating with 
the EU. In the south, ENP has been generally successful. For instance,  Morocco 
and Tunisia have a solid record in the implementation of economic modernisation 
and reform policies. Palestinian Territories has been a willing partner in drawing 
up an Action Plan. Israel has been favourable towards deepening relationship with 
the EU. Jordan is a cooperative political partner for the EU, and has a solid record 
of  economic  reforms.  The  problematic  countries  in  the  region  seem  to  be 
Lebanon, Egypt, Algeria, Syria and Libya.  Lebanon has  security challenges that 
prevent it from developing closer economic and political cooperation with the EU. 
Egypt, Libya, Syria and Algeria does not consider their relationships with the EU 
as a priority mostly for economic and political reasons (Emerson et al, 2007: 30-
31).
Nevertheless, the ENP is far from being perfect. First of all, it does not 
provide  clear  incentives  to  the  involved  countries.  As  Smith  (2005:  771-772) 
points out, providing neighbours with clear benchmarks for reforms and offering 
clear  incentives  are  necessary.  Currently,  “the  ENP  requires  much  of  the 
neighbours, and offers only vague incentives in return” (Smith, 2005: 774). The 
ENP is particularly bound to be a failure unless economic incentives are provided 
to the neighbours as the economic side of ENP is not robust enough to act as a 
sufficient incentive for the neighbours (Haukkala, 2006: 7). In this respect, the 
major complication seems to be that “the EU’s budget is more likely to shrink 
than to increase in the face of new challenges”, and the EU is no longer generating 
the resources  that  it  could  use  beyond its  borders  (Haukkala,  2006:  14).  It  is 
equally doubtful whether the Union is really able to offer its neighbours market 
access that is required, especially by the Eastern neighbours. Haukkala (2006: 14-
15) asserts that is unlikely that the interests within the EU would allow opening of 
the Union’s internal market to the products particularly from the East. 
Furthermore, it is obvious, for instance that countries such as Turkey and 
Ukraine will not accept anything less than full membership as an incentive. In this 
context,  the  ambiguity  on  whether  the  enlargement  will  continue  or  not 
undermines the efficiency of the ENP. Up to now, the EU has not been decisive 
with a clear “no” to the membership expectations of the neighbouring countries. 
Although, the ENP has been somewhat a success in terms of providing the EU 
with a broad range of instruments and alternative policies than in the past, it has 
not been able to make a significant impact on countries and conflicts such as the 
ones  between  the  Palestinian  Authority  and  Israel,  or  where  the  scale  of  the 
problems and the involvement of other important actors such as Russia has been 
overwhelming (Smith  2005:  772-773).  In  particular,  the  EU has  been  heavily 
criticized  that  it  has  not  been  engaged  in  the  conflicts  in  the  neighbouring 
countries such as Moldova, Georgia, or Armenia and Azerbaijan which can be 
accepted as the insufficiency of the ENP in these regions. After the European 
Union’s 2004 round of enlargement, its neighbourhood now includes the Balkans, 
Southern Caucasus, Russia and the Southern Mediterranean, which constitute a 
serious challenge for the EU security. This is because; these neighbourhoods lack 
security,  development  and  democracy.  One of  the  key  issues  has  been  to  co-
ordinate policies with those of the US, which prefers to maintain security in some 
regions  through military  means.  Hence  EU has  to  cooperate  with  the  US for 
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establishing  a  stabilized  neighbourhood  (Harris,  2004:  100),  which  may  not 
always be an easy task.
Furthermore,  as  Smith  (2005:  772-773)  explains,  the  EU’s  efforts  to 
influence  politics  in  non-democratic  regimes  in  the  Mediterranean  has  been 
ineffectual. In particular, the EU has not applied political conditionality, and the 
political dialogue has not had the expected effect on democracy or human rights 
possibly  due  to  the  “fear  of  giving  too  much  political  space  to  Islamic 
fundamentalists”  (Smith,  2005:  772).  Another  factor  is  the  EU’s  fear  of 
destabilizing countries “whose support for a Middle East peace agreement and 
action  against  terrorism and illegal  immigration  are  so  crucial”  (Smith,  2005: 
772). Especially the Euro-Mediterranean process, which was an attempt to foster 
mutual trust that might ease security concerns in the Middle East, has yet to be a 
success with little or no progress in the peace-making process in the region. 
More  importantly,  although  the  action  plans  encourage  cross-border 
cooperation  and  political  dialogue  due  to  the  broad  geography  of  the 
neighbourhood and the difference between the problems and challenges between 
the Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean regions , regular meetings or contacts 
among all of the neighbours have not been held and there exists no cooperation in 
the ENP. This emphasizes “the difficulties inherent in constructing a meaningful 
and effective multilateral dialogue among so many different countries” (Smith, 
2005:  772).  In  particular,  the  ENP  needs  to  maintain  the  bilateral-regional-
multilateral balance. In the East the ENP has been entirely bilateral, whereas the 
Barcelona process has been largely multilateral. Especially, in the trade area, a 
strategic multilateral dimension for East and South together may be considered 
(Emerson et al, 2007: 3). 
5. Conclusion
It is clear that the ENP has enhanced the EU’s role in the international 
arena and improved the credibility of its foreign, security and defence policies 
despite the fact that it is still a very new policy. Nevertheless, it has also been 
identified that the policy is by no means perfect and there exists scope for further 
improvement in terms of its effectiveness. It is worth noting that the ENP is still a 
very new policy, but it has enhanced the EU’s role in the international arena and 
improved the credibility of its foreign, security and defence policies within its soft 
power framework. The ENP, as a foreign policy instrument, partially substituted 
the  enlargement  instrument  in  shaping  the  EU’s  foreign  policy  in  a  wide 
geography by offering its partners not a membership but partnership in economic, 
social, cultural, and political terms without putting away the future prospects of its 
partners.  Although  the  EU  does  not  offer  a  prospect  of  membership  at  the 
beginning of the partnership as an encouragement, the economic encouragements 
offered  through  the  partnership  are  not  trivial  for  the  partners.  In  these 
circumstances, the EU, as a soft/normative power, continues to promote its values 
which have been founded on democracy, respect to human rights, and the rule of 
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law with the incentives of creating a more peaceful Europe both in economic and 
political means.
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